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Abstract: The Growing Block Theory of time arose within the field of time metaphysics partly 
as an alternative position to the doctrines of Presentism and Eternalism. According to the 
growing blockists, while both the past and the present are real, the future is not. As time goes 
on the universal block of reality increases, adding new slices of present events to the current 
past ones. Consequently, the layers of reality grow and so does our ontology. The purpose of 
this paper will be to examine the growing block theory from the perspective of the epistemic 
objection. According to Bourne (2002) and Braddon-Mitchell (2004), if reality is taken to be a 
growing block and all there is is past and present, there is no way in which we could know 
whether the current now is the objective now. Firstly I will disect both the growing block theory 
and the epistemic objection. Then, we will consider one possible response that came from 
Forrest (2004), who invoked the notion of consciousness in arguing that it is simply wrong to 
ascribe any phenomenology to the past. This is what came to be known as the Dead Past Reply. 
Ultimately I will argue that although the dead past reply is able to dodge the criticism it does 
so at the cost of weird metaphysics and a zombie ontology.  
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For many years two theories were championed through the time debate in philosophy, 
Presentism and Eternalism. Broadly speaking, while the former one holds that only the present 
(and the presently existing things) exist, the latter one argues that both the past and the future 
exist in the same way the present does1. Presentists tend to argue that the property of being 
present is a genuine feature of the world and that this feature changes as time goes by. In 
opposition, eternalists deny this thesis and consider that all past, present and future exist in the 
very same way, as well as the objects that inhabit those time-locations. The debate between 
presentists and eternalists has been quite extensive, many different perspectives have taken 
 
1 There has been considerable debate over the correct characterization of both presentism and eternalism. 
However, since it is not our topic I won’t go into details. The present definition would suffice for our purposes. 
For a good characterization of both theories I recommend to see Miller (2013) and Golosz (2013). 
place and, although interesting, it is not my intention to cover that debate here. My intention is 
rather to examine the presence of a third contender in this arena, the Growing Block Theory2.  
Growing-blockism, or no-futurism as some philosophers have called it, has been characterized 
as a halfway theory. Just like eternalists the growing block theory denies that only the present 
is existent. They contend that both the past and the present are part of our universal ontology. 
However, growing-blockists deny that future moments and events exist. According to them, 
reality grows in the sense that every event that is present constitutes the last slice located at the 
end of the universal block of existence. Being so, events that were once at the verge of existence 
fade into the past ceasing to presently exist. Different criticism have arisen since the appearance 
of the growing block theory in Broad’s (1923) Scientific Thought. One of the most famous 
criticisms was the famous epistemic objection, also known as the now-now problem. The 
objection was originally raised by Bourne (2002) and also developed by Braddon-Mitchell 
(2004). Both argued that if the growing block theory is correct, and our ontology, as well as 
the metaphysics of time are to be understood in terms of a gradually increasing reality, there is 
no way in which an agent could know whether our current now is the objective now. In other 
words, it would be impossible to determine whether we are in the objective present or past. 
It will be my task in this paper to dissect and thresh this criticism. The first part of the paper 
will be dedicated to briefly sketch out the core notions of the growing block theory. Then, in 
section two I will analyze the problem that Bourne and Braddon-Mitchell famously posited 
becoming one of the main obstacles of growing-blockists. Part three of the article will be 
devoted to present Forrest’s Dead Past reply. Finally, in the last section, I will argue that even 
though Forrest’s response is able to effectively avoid the objection it only does so at the cost 
of postulating a phenomenological asymmetry that results in a zombie ontology and the 
appearance of new and old worries such as the persistence problem or the cartesian solipsism. 
 
 
2. The Growing Block Theory of Time: The Future is Yet to Come 
 
So, as I said, the growing block theory was originally presented in 1923 by C. D. Broad in his 
famous Scientific Thought. In this book Broad presented a new dynamic account of the 
metaphysics of time, according to which what there is and exists increases as time goes by. 
Reality is understood as a growing block, things are constantly added to the set of our ontology 
in the verge of existence, often also called the edge of becoming. Otherwise speaking, things 
begin to exist at the very verge of existence, meaning that events always happen on the last 
layer of reality and there is nothing else beyond. As the block continues to grow the moments 
that were once on the last layer of reality are pushed back in to the objective past. When new 
moments come into existence they become part of the objective present. Being so, becoming 
is nothing more than coming into existence. In chaper two of his book Broad stresses this in 
the following way: 
 
2 There is in fact a fourth contender in the ring, namely The Moving Spotlight Theory. Nevertheless, I take this 
theory to fall under the umbrella of eternalism. This might be arguable, but that’s a topic for another essay.  
 When we say that a thing changes in quality, or that an event changes in pastness, we 
are talking of entities that exist both before and after the moment at which the change 
takes place. But, when an event becomes, it comes into existence, and it was not 
anything at all until it had become. You cannot say that a future event is one that 
suceeds the present, for a present event is defined as one that is suceeded by nothig. 
[…] since future events are non entities, they cannot stand in any relations to 
anything, and therefore cannot stand in the relation of succession to present events. 
[…] if future events succeeded present events, they would have the contradictory 
property of succeding something that has no successor, and therefore they cannot be 
real.3,4 
 
Here, Broad stands both against presentism and eternalism. Presentists are committed to the 
doctrine that change always happens in the present. As long as they deny the existence of past 
and future, change over time is taken to be understood in terms of temporal passage. Broad 
attacks this notion of change arguing that when events happen at the verge of existence they 
do not suffer any change, they simply come into existence. Now, in regard to eternalism Broad 
denies that future events could be considered existent in any sense. To the extent that the 
objective present is defined as the last layer of reality, nothing can succeed it. 
Following Miller (2013) the growing-blockists are committed to two main theses: 
 
T1. Growing Block Ontological Thesis (GBOT): Past and present moments and events 
exist, but future moments and events do not exist.  
 
T2. Dynamical Thesis (DT): The present moves, which moment is the present moment 
changes.5 
 
Both theses have the virtue of going hand in hand with our intuitive understanding of what the 
metaphysical nature of time is. On the one hand, (GBOT) is based on the intuition that while 
the past remains fixed, the future is open. As long as the future has not still happened it does 
not exist, whereas the past has already happened and the present is just happening. On the other 
hand, (DT) grasps our ordinary understanding of how the present is an everchanging state. 
Events that were once present fade constantly into the past and those that are yet to be present 
come in to existence at the verge of existence. Growing-blockism offers us an explanation of 
our intuition that while reality is dynamic the present is evanescent. As time keeps passing, 
reality keeps becoming.    
 
 
3 Broad (1927) pg. 68. 
4 Italics by Broad. 
5 Miller (2013), pg. 348. 
 3. The Epistemic Objection: Is It Already Now? 
 
On the light of what we have said above it seems hard to deny that the growing block theory 
has some advantageous features. However, not everybody was persuaded by the growing block 
proposal. The most prominent complaint to the growing blockists came in the form of the now-
now objection, more commonly known as the epistemic objection. This problem was first 
formulated by Bourne in When am I? A tense time for some tense theorists? And further 
developed by Braddon-Mitchell in How do we know it is now now? To make a long story short, 
both Bourne and Braddon-Mitchell argued that if reality is taken to be a growing block, there 
is no possible way in which an agent could know whether she is located at the objective present 
or past. The reason for this is that on the growing block view the notion of now is referentially 
ambiguous between the indexical and objective use. While we can know that it is now on the 
indexical sense, we cannot know that it is now in the objective sense, since past and present 
are claimed to exist in the same way and phenomenology of time passage remains unchanged 
across time slices. A Bourne & Braddon-Mitchell type of example will illuminate the problem: 
Let's suppose that reality is in fact a growing block. Temporal flow and our phenomenical 
perception of time passage is explained in terms of the progressive growth of reality. New 
slices of present events are constantly added to the block in the ceaseless verge of becoming 
thereby pushing back moments that were once present into the objective past. In such scenario, 
Neil Armstrong was once at the moment in which he stepped down the Apolo 11 becoming the 
first person to walk on the moon. There was an objective time in which the event of Armstrong 
giving his first step on the moon was located in the verge of existence, namely, the objective 
present. Afterwards, that event was pushed back in the block thereby becoming part of the 
objective past. Now, let us suppose that for a moment, when stepping down the spaceship, 
Armstrong believed to be doing so in the present. No one could deny that such a belief was 
correct. However, as Armstrong's stepping on the moon became part of the objective past that 
same belief did so, thus becoming immediately wrong. The reason is that the past Armstrong 
would no longer be stepping the moon in the objective present. The problem is that since the 
growing-blockist seems to be unable to account for the subjective phenomenology of agents 
across objective times, it would appear to be impossible to determine which objective time we 
are experiencing. In other words, while Armstrong stepping on the moon is clearly past for us, 
it was once indexically present for him. But, how could he know that was objectively so? 
Moreover, there is a further concern with the locational problem besides skepticism. If reality 
is a growing block and there are an infinite (or huge) amount of events located in the past slices, 
given that there is only one single moment located in the objective present, it is much more 
likely to think that we are in the objective past. Simply put, odds are against us. Miller (2018) 
does an excellent job unpacking the argument: 
 
1. If w is a growing block world, then for any arbitrary slice, S, in w, and individual, J, 
located at S, there are very many more times at which S is not objectively present than 
times at which S is objectively present.  
2. J’s S-predicaments are subjectively indistinguishable. 
3. If J’s S-predicaments are subjectively indistinguishable then J ought to assign equal 
credence to being in each of the S-predicaments. 
4. So J ought to assign equal credence to being in each of the S predicaments.  
5. Since there are many more S-predicaments at which S is objectively non-present, than 
at which S is objectively present, J ought to assign very low credence to being in a 
predicament at which S is objectively persent, and very high credence to being in some 
predicament or other at which S is objectively non present. 
6. If J ought to assign very high credence to being in some predicament or other at which 
S is objectively non present, then J is not justified in believing that she is located in the 
objective present.  
7. If J is not justified in believing that she is located in the objective present, then J does 
not know that she is located in the objective present.  




4. A Response: Zombifying the Past 
 
So far we have presented the growing block theory and one double counting objection. On the 
one hand there is the epistemic worry that none of us could know whether we are located in the 
objective present or not. On the other hand, there is the objection that given the ontological and 
metaphysical structure of the growing block framework it seems that we have much more 
reasons to think that we are located in the past than in the objective present. Furthermore, on 
assumption that our phenomenology remains untouched as present slides fade in to the past we 
would require of an explanation to our temporal phenomenology that is not grounded on our 
perception of the objective present . The core of the epistemic objection lays in that there really 
are no compelling reasons to believe that we are on the last layer of the block. 
Now, one interesting response that some defenders of the growing block theory invoke came 
from Forrest’s (2004). Forrest criticized premise (2) in arguing that the epistemic objection 
presupposes past phenomenology. According to Forrest both Bourne and Braddon-Mitchell 
assume that individuals located at past slices of the block enjoy the same kind of existence as 
the individuals that are located at the verge of reality. However, consciousness could never take 
place at past slices of the block for it only happens at the boundary of existence. The Armstrong 
that is now located at the past slice in which he stepped down the Apolo 11 lacks any 
phenomenology because he is simply dead. Being so, the growing block theory implies that it 
is necessary for the existence of any phenomenology at a given time that that time is in fact the 
objective present. Thus, as long as an agent J has any phenomenology at all she knows that she 
is in the objective present. This has come to be known as the Dead Past reply. 
Having said this, we can see how the dead past view addresses the Bourne and Braddon-
Mitchell objection about the comparative status of past and present events by introducing 
phenomenological (and ontological) asymmetry. The dead past response argues that it is simply 
 
6 Miller (2017), pg. 4. 
wrong to ascribe any kind of phenomenology to the past. It is in this sense that Forrest argues 
that there is no life located in the past slices of the block. Given that there could not be 
consciousness in the dead past, nor could there be any thought and, thus the epistemic objection 
is blocked. As Forrest himself puts it ‘’life and sentience are activities not states. Activities 
only occur on the boundary of reality, while states can be in the past.’’7,8 Accordingly, only 
those that inhabit the last layer of reality are considered living, conscious and perceiving 
beings. Adopting this metaphysical view allows the growing-blockist to block the skeptic 




5. Consequences: Zombie Ontology, Persistence and The Return of The Cartesian Doubt 
 
It appears that the dead past solution does solve the epistemic objection. However, it only does 
so at the cost of positing some odd metaphysical consequences. I will begin with my major 
concern. The dead past view’s answer to the epistemic objection raises the worry of committing 
to two distinct types of existence. The phenomenological asymmetry that Forrest introduces 
distinguishes past and present in saying that the entities located at past slices of the block lack 
any kind of life or activity, whereas the objective present is the only possible time in which one 
could postulate such ontological features. If so, it begins to look as if the growing-blockist 
would be allowing for distinct types of existence. Namely, the lively ones at the verge of 
existence and the zombie existent entities in the dead past. I think that Occam would have 
something to say about Forrest’s ontological consequences. 
Having said this, there is an additional worry that arises from this notion of a zombie ontology. 
The problem of persistence through time. It is intuitive enough to say that past objects persist 
through time just like the ones that are alive and active in the growing end of the block. 
Although dead and past, earlier slices of myself persist through time in the very same way that 
I do when inhabiting the last layer of reality. However, the dead past view commits to an odd 
type of persistence for as soon as new temporal slices of a given entity come in to existence the 
old ones are pushed back into the dead past, changing from being presently alive and active to 
exist pastly and dead. Hence, it is not that things that are alive and existing at the end of the 
block continue to persist as they currently are, rather it would seem that they persist by having 
part of them die and fade off into the past. This would imply that the Armstrong that landed in 
the earth on the 24th of July 1969 after having stepped in the moon would have lost something 
in the ceaseless voyage that is time passage. Perhaps Forrest is saying that the old Armstrong 
died and a new one came in to existence? A very strange way of understaing identity and 
persistence if you ask me. 
Finally, It would be unfair not to mention Braddon-Mitchell's concern about Forrest’s 
cartesianism. In his paper Braddon-Mitchell acknowledges that the dead past view does in fact 
solve the epistemic problem, but at the cost of falling prey of solipsism. Assuming that there is 
 
7 Forrest (2004), pg. 359. 
8 Italics by me. 
in fact an objective now located at the verge of existence, and that we can epistemically access 
this a priori knowledge, it seems difficult to explain the simultaneous existence of other entities 
that apparently inhabit the objective present. Forrest requires going one step further if he wishes 
to explain the presentness of those entities who seem to share our temporal location. In words 
of Braddon-Mitchell ‘’if objective presentness is required for consciousness, then unless we 
know which the preferred frame of reference is, we do not even know whether our apparent 
col- leagues are Zombies; for perhaps the preferred frame is one in which none of these 
colleagues are simultaneous with me.’’9 Forrest explicitly bites this bullet in saying that enough 
is good enough, it is simply out of our possibilities to know and be sure that our co-temporal 
colleges are alive and conscious with respect to our frame of reference. All that we are left with 
is hope and reasonable belief. 
 
 
6. Conclusion and Corollary 
 
Having reached the end of this article it is now time for a brief recap. On the first section we 
presented the core notions of Broad’s growing block theory of time. We saw how growing-
blockists are committed to the ontological and dynamical thesis and how the theory matches 
our folk metaphysics and ontology of time. On part two we brought up the famous epistemic 
objection as originally presented by both Bourne and Braddon-Mitchell. We unpacked the 
argument and saw how skepticism about the objective present poses a problem for the growing 
block theory. On section four we analyzed Forrest’s dead past reply in order to see how 
effectively he dodges the epistemical criticism. Finally, in the last section above we claimed 
that even though Forrest’s response does in fact avoid the now-now objection it gives raise to 
new ontological and metaphysical problems concerning existence, persistence and a potential 
solipsism. 
 
To close up I would like to now clear the air. The aim of this paper was not to challenge or 
attack the growing block theory in any way. In fact, I sympathize with Broad’s account of time, 
and I do think that the growing block theory is the theory that best matches our intuitive 
perception of time. However, intuition does not suffice and further explanations are needed. 
The epistemic objection poses a legitimate worry about epistemic accessibility to time location, 
a challenge that the growing-blockist needs to answer. Forrest’s dead past view attempts to 







9 Forrest (2004), pg. 360. 
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